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Abstract: A basic tenet of ecological economics is that economic growth and development 
are ultimately constrained  by environmental  carrying capacities. It is  from this  basis that 
notions  of  a  sustainable  economy  and  of  sustainable  economic  development  emerge  to 
undergird  the  ‘standard  model’  of  ecological  economics.  However,  the  belief  in  ‘hard’ 
environmental constraints may be obscuring the important role of the entrepreneur in the co-
evolution  of  economic  and  environmental  relations,  and  hence  limiting  or  distorting  the 
analytic focus of ecological economics and the range of policy options that are considered for 
sustainable  economic  development.  This  paper  outlines  a  co-evolutionary  model  of  the 
dynamics of economic and ecological systems as connected by entrepreneurial behaviour. We 
then discuss some of the key analytic and policy implications.        
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1  Reconciling economic and environmental dynamics 
‘Establishing the relationship between economic performance and ecological performance’, 
venture Boons and Wagner (2009: 1908), ‘resembles something like finding the Holy Grail.’  
Ecological  economics  is  the  scientific  research  program  at  the  core of  this  endeavour to  
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elucidate the structure and dynamics of the complex economic-ecological relationship. It does 
so by mapping and modelling energy and material flows, system resilience, economic and 
socio-cultural behaviours, institutions and co-evolutionary processes (Norgaard 1985; Ayres 
1994, Gowdy 1994; Perrings 1998; van den Bergh and van der Straaten 1997; van den Bergh 
and Gowdy 2000; Krausmann et al 2009; Ayres and Warr 2009). A basic tenet of ecological 
economics  is  that  economic  growth  and  development  are  ultimately  constrained  by 
environmental carrying capacities. It is from this basis that notions of a sustainable economy 
and  of  sustainable  economic  development  emerge  to  undergird  the  ‘standard  model’  of 
ecological economics. However, the widespread belief in ‘hard’ environmental constraints 
may  be  obscuring  the  important  role  of  entrepreneurship  in  co-evolutionary  interactions 
between the economy  and the environment. If this  is the case,  it  may  have distorted the 
analytic focus of ecological economics in a way that has limited the range of policy options 
available to achieve sustainable economic development.  
The belief that economic growth and development are ultimately constrained by hard 
environmental and ecological limits is well established in the field of ecological economics. 
This ‘ultimate scarcity’ argument is commonly formulated in terms of the limits to loadings 
on ecological services (Arrow et al. 1995; Costanza et al. 1997). Ecological constraints thus 
define long-run limits on economic evolution and growth. This reinstates J.S Mill’s concept 
of  the  tendency  towards  a  stationary  state,  but  conceived  ecologically,  rather  than 
technologically. This  argument can  be traced back to the resource constraint concerns of 
Thomas Malthus and William Stanley Jevons, among others, through to the modern work of 
Nicholas  Georgescu-Roegen  (1971)  and  Kenneth  Boulding  (1978)  and  via  ecological 
conceptions  of  environmental  limits  to  economic  growth  (Daly  1996,  1973).  This  is 
‘spaceship-earth  economics,’  using  Boulding’s  (1966)  felicitous  phrase,  in  which  the  
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fundamental  limits  to  economic  development  and  growth  are  ultimately  constrained  by 
environmental carrying capacities and system resilience.  
On spaceship earth, then, the human economy is locally and globally dependent upon 
the  natural  environment,  sine  qua  non.  Seeking  a  sustainable  economy  and  sustainable 
economic development thus underpin the ‘standard model’ of ecological economics. This, in 
turn, defines an overarching research program, viz. Boons and Wagner’s search for the ‘Holy 
Grail’,  in  terms  of  a  quest  for  the  critical  technical  and  institutional  rules  that  yield  a 
sustainable  economy.  Such  rules  involve  consideration  of  behaviours,  strategies, 
technologies, institutions and policy settings (Arrow et al 1995, Arrow et al 2004, Ayres 
2008). As such, inquiry into the operational and institutional properties of such a sustainable 
economic model―and by ‘sustainable’ we refer to the capacity of the environment to sustain 
human  life  and  current  levels  of  economic  activity  without  degrading  the  quality  of 
environmental  services―and  the  pathways  by  which  we  might  achieve  them  is,  thus, 
rightfully central to the research program and indeed the normative conception of ecological 
economics.  
The necessity to consider the complex interaction of institutional, technological and 
industrial dynamics means that ecological economics can profitably draw upon perspectives 
and findings of evolutionary economics. In particular, Gowdy (1994), van den Bergh and 
Gowdy  (2000),  van  den  Bergh  (2007)  and  Buenstorf  (2000)  have  all  drawn  useful  and 
insightful attention to the many distinct commonalities between evolutionary and ecological 
economics,  including population  methods, complex  systems analysis, energetic  flows and 
other such correspondences. They  argue that evolutionary economics can provide greater 
insight  into the  properties  and  characteristics  of  a  sustainable  economy  than  neoclassical 
economics. This is due to the specific attention that evolutionary economists pay to such 
concepts  as  endogenous  preferences,  differential  selection  and  industrial  dynamics,  self- 
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organization,  entropy  and  economic  evolution,  and  institutional  and  technological  co-
evolution. In this vein, a recent special section in the journal, Ecological Economics, has 
attempted to reignite a co-evolutionary research agenda for ecological economics (Kallis and 
Norgaard  2010).  Thus,  it  would  seem  uncontentious  that  evolutionary  economics  and 
ecological  economics  should  be  viewed  as  contiguous  fields  with  (evolving)  ecological 
systems defining the ultimate constraints for (evolving) economic systems (Perrings 1998, 
van  den  Bergh  and  Gowdy  2000).  This  perspective  is  near  axiomatic  in  ecological 
economics; as Kallis and Norgaard point out, the co-evolutionary approach ‘has not taken off 
within ecological economics’ (2010: 690). But is it actually true?  
As a further development of arguments encountered in the nature vs. culture, or limits 
to growth debate (Meadows et al. 1972, Cole et al. 1973, Meadows et al. 1992, Ekins 1993, 
Nordhaus 1994, Costanza 2000, Costanza et al. 2000, Meadows et al. 2004), an alternative 
perspective can be assembled by recognising that the environmental or ecological constraint 
may not always be hard, but only apparently so. For example, ecological constraints may 
become apparent as a problem before they impact fully upon economic activity. Typically, 
such constraints take the form of looming resource scarcities or increasing stress loadings on 
particular environmental services. Evolutionary economics tells us that, if there is adequate 
information and the problem is not entirely ‘locked in’, adaptive behaviour is likely to be 
manifest in such circumstances. Exploratory search will occur and innovative solutions will 
emerge. Those who engage in this kind of activity are ‘entrepreneurial’―they look to create 
value in states of uncertainty where market signals are weak or non-existent. What do we 
mean  by  entrepreneurial?  We  view  it  as  a  product of  a  cognitive  state,  as  discussed  by 
Nooteboom (2009: 174–84), and, thus, quite distinct from the ‘rational agent’ perspective of 
conventional economics.   
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An act of entrepreneurship can ameliorate a constraint, rather than being limited by it 
(Rammel 2003). There are multiple ways that this might be achieved: for example by shifting 
resources,  by  making  resource  substitutions,  by  bringing  new  technologies  or  business 
models to bear on the problem, or by new forms of contracts, organizations or institutions. An 
environmental  constraint  can, thus,  function  as  an  incentive  within  which  entrepreneurial 
agents  can  see  opportunities.  There  are  many  examples  of  the  operation  of  this 
‘entrepreneurial  loop’  in  evolutionary  economics  and  in  the  related  field  of  innovation 
economics. There is no reason why such a loop should not also operate at the interface of 
economic and ecological dynamics. In considering such a possibility, we may arrive at a very 
different sense of the  mechanisms that dynamically connect economic and environmental 
systems.  
The  defining  feature  of  this  alternate  perspective  is  that  the  ‘fast’  evolutionary 
dynamics  of  the  growth  of  knowledge  process,  manifested  in,  for  example,  economic 
evolution  and  associated  creative  destruction,  comes  to  dominate the  ‘slow’  evolutionary 
dynamics  of  the  ecosystem,  weakening  its  resilience  (Gual  and  Norgaard  2010).  The 
knowledge-base of the economic order is ever changing and ‘restless’ (Metcalfe 1998). This 
creates a serviceable or ‘bounded environment’ that is sufficient for most purposes or ‘good 
enough’,  but  not  more-so;  it  does  not  contain  ‘slack’  or  unexploited  opportunities  (cf. 
Leibenstein 1978). The properties of ecosystems are determined by revealed preferences for 
environmental qualities, services, etc, but not more-so. From this perspective, the observation 
of growing environmental damage or the onset of an impending ecological collapse presents 
entrepreneurial opportunities. Note that we specifically say ‘the onset of’, and do not refer to 
a final state of ecological collapse. This is because those states do not always eventuate, most 
notably in those societies where entrepreneurial behaviour is encouraged. The entrepreneurial 
mechanism, in appropriate conditions, can operate effectively on the basis of an expectation  
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of an impending collapse. Entrepreneurs seek out ways to provide innovative solutions that 
can  be  traded  profitably  in  newly  created  market  mechanisms.  What  is  a  ‘negative 
externality’ can be removed by entrepreneurial actions that permit those who feel damaged 
by it to purchase goods and services that fix the problem, perhaps not entirely, but enough to 
avert disaster. 
But entrepreneurship is not limited to the economic domain; such conditions can also 
present entrepreneurial opportunities in the political or the socio-cultural domains, or perhaps 
in both. Baumol and Strom (2010) cite historical evidence that much of entrepreneurship 
prior to the 18
th Century was in these domains with rewards in the form of power and status. 
Entrepreneurial opportunities in the economic, political and cultural domains can thus lead to 
different  forms  of  technological,  behavioural  and  institutional  change.  These  integrate  to 
produce complex adaptations in anticipation of environmental change. Entrepreneurial action 
thus has a dual impact. Entrepreneurial success in introducing innovations and generating 
economic growth causes environmental stresses in an unintended manner but entrepreneurs 
also respond to the value creating opportunities that such stresses offer. Thus, we can have a 
process of cumulative causation where entrepreneurial activity, in states of uncertainty, leads 
to unintended negative environmental affects which, when revealed, stimulate entrepreneurial 
activity that mitigates such effects. And on it goes, with each new solution inducing new and 
different environmental problems that in turn create new economic opportunities. Thus the 
notion of convergence upon a global ‘stationary state’ at an environmental limit is not always 
helpful. Equally, it becomes difficult to know how to define what a long-period ‘sustainable 
economy’ (Krausmann et al 2009; cf. Gowdy 1994) is at any point in economy-environment 
co-evolution and what its stability properties might be. In complex systems, saying anything 
definite about long periods  is difficult. For example, Malthus clearly under-estimated the  
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power of innovating entrepreneurs but Diamond (2005) gives us several examples of societies 
that collapsed in the face of hard environmental constraints. 
The  historical  evidence  points  to  the  fact  that  humans  are  both  ecologically 
destructive (Penn 2003) as well as entrepreneurial in response to opportunities. But these 
tendencies  are  connected:  a  widespread  expectation  of  ecological  destruction  alerts 
entrepreneurs to opportunities (Boons and Wagner 2009). This can happen in many ways. It 
is common, for example, in ecological economics to recognise the primacy of the incentive 
effect of environmental regulations on induced technical innovations and entrepreneurship 
(Rennings 2000; Beise and Rennings 2005). But there are other pathways via direct market 
signals, as well as indirectly via socio-cultural pathways, yielding multiple opportunities for 
entrepreneurial  responses  to  ongoing  challenges  posed  by  environmental  degradation. 
Regulatory  adaptation  is  often  slow,  so  these  other  pathways  can  be  critical.  Indeed, 
regulatory change can be an endogenous response to movements along these other pathways. 
If entrepreneurship is, indeed, responsive to environmental degradation, it can be argued that 
a  co-evolutionary  connection  exists  between  economic  and  ecological  systems.  This  co-
evolution centres upon the growth of knowledge about environmental degradation and the 
capacities of entrepreneurs to take the opportunities that are presented.  
Environmental and ecological problems are omnipresent, but entrepreneurial actions 
can  solve  them  if  prevailing  socioeconomic  and  cultural  rules  permit  them  to  do  so. 
Entrepreneurs do not usually respond directly to  information concerning degradation  but, 
instead, react to information about its  impacts upon human welfare  and wellbeing. Price 
signals  often  translate  a  problem  into  economic  terms.  For  example,  when  overfishing 
seriously reduces fish stocks, fish prices usually rise to unprecedented levels. Entrepreneurs 
who anticipate that fish will be in short supply, either because of stock exhaustion or severe 
governmental  restrictions  on  fishing,  will  see  opportunities  to  invest  in  sustainable  fish  
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farming. This maintains fish supply while removing environmental pressure. However, this 
will  not  be  possible  without  adequate  flows  of  information,  appropriate  regulatory 
frameworks and the existence of viable market institutions. Because we live in an uncertain 
world, there tends to be continuous lurching from one environmental crisis to the next. Each 
current ecological crisis is the unintended consequence of previous economic innovations 
which, in turn, can be resolved by new economic innovations. So while Gowdy, van den 
Bergh  and  Buenstorf  et  al  do  correctly  elucidate  the  benefits  of  integrating  evolutionary 
economics  and  ecological  economics,  they  nevertheless  underplay  the  self-organizational 
feedback  implications  of  entrepreneurial  activity.  Although  governments  can  devise 
regulatory  frameworks  that  facilitate  the  process  of  environmental  protection  and 
regeneration  they  cannot  act  as  rapidly  as  entrepreneurs  in  introducing  the  necessary 
innovations and inducing the associated creative destruction. Governments are constrained 
and slowed by vested interests; entrepreneurs destroy such interests.  
 
2  Elements of a model  
What  then  are  the  elements  of  a  co-evolutionary  model  of  the  complex  interactions  and 
evolutionary dynamics of economic and ecological systems?  
First,  it  is  necessary  to  acknowledge  that  the  environmental  degradation  that  we 
observe is, ultimately, due to the use of free energy flow to drive economic activities that 
yield goods and services to growing populations. Such degradation is a manifestation of the 
entropy process that must accompany increasing order and complexity in economic systems 
(Ayres and Warr, 2009; Foster, 2010). This perspective was first presented in Georgescu-
Roegen (1971) and generalised to an open system (or dissipative system) context in Foster 
(1996) and Raine et al (2006). Spaceship earth  travels according to the  laws of physics,  
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whereby  large energetic transformations  must satisfy the second  law of thermodynamics. 
Economic  evolution  thus  runs  up  an  energetic  gradient  (Schneider  and  Sagan,  2005) 
Increased energetic throughput is associated not only with an increased quantity of energy 
conversion  but  also  with  changes  in  the  quality  of  the  energetic  form,  as  in  the  highly 
controlled  use  of  energy  for  moving  electrons  or  photons  in  precise  ways  to  perform 
computation  (Huber  and  Mills  2004).  Because  entrepreneurs  must,  necessarily,  make 
decisions in uncertainty, they are the key actors in the process whereby increased energy use 
has resulted in economic growth. But they have also been key players in the introduction of 
innovations  that  have  resulted  in  more  efficient  energy  use.  Environmental  degradation 
depends critically upon the energy-entropy nexus and entrepreneurs, for better or worse, have 
always been at its core.  
Second,  our  model  must  recognise  that  environmental  resource  depletion  and 
degradation in ecological systems and services present new opportunities for human action. 
Economists commonly conceptualise this negatively in terms of increased scarcity, i.e. action 
in response to a rise in the price of a factor, inducing reduced use of that factor relative to 
others. But, as we have discussed, this may also lead to longer term thinking about how to 
achieve the underlying goal in a different way. Invention and innovation can result in new 
connections and combinations that can generate value or new ways of creating value. There 
are no hard environmental constraints on economic evolution and there are no hard economic 
constraints  on  natural  evolution.  Economic  evolution  is  a  fast  process  that  modifies  the 
natural environment while natural evolution is a slow process that can inflict catastrophic 
impacts  on  human  society  in  the  longer  term.  Knowledge  of  the  possibility  of  the  latter 
provides entrepreneurial opportunities, for example, in developing alternative energy sources 
and carbon trading.   
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Third, our model must recognise that the increasing complexity in the institutional 
rules that are operative in an evolving economic system is an outcome of the co-evolving 
economic-ecological  process.  As  ecological  systems  become  stressed  by  the  growth  of 
economic  systems,  the  latter  can  respond  by  becoming  more  (not  less)  complex.  The 
presumption  that  environmental  stresses  lead  inexorably  to  economic  stress,  as  in  the 
Malthusian hypothesis, is a false analogy from the ecosystem context whereby a species in a 
diminished  environment cannot respond ‘entrepreneurially’  by creating and  implementing 
new  technologies,  organisational  structures  and  institutional  rules.  Instead,  population 
dynamics over extant variety is the prime ecological mechanism of resolution. This is not true 
of  economic  mechanisms.  Although  we  can  find  historic  examples  where  economic 
exploitation has wholly depleted a natural environmental niche, we can also find cases where 
depletion did not occur because of adaptive, forward looking behaviour by entrepreneurial 
risk-takers.  
Subject  to  cultural  and  legal/political  constraints,  economic  entrepreneurship  can 
create new organisational, institutional and technological rules that can resolve environmental 
problems. This may seem counter-intuitive if it is increased economic activity that causes 
environmental problems in the first place. So to suppose that further increases in economic 
activity  might resolve these problems  may  seem perverse. But ‘economic activity’  is  not 
homogenous over time; it is adaptive and can change qualitatively. This does not deny that 
new activities will not create new environmental and ecological problems―for they almost 
certainly  will―but  the  point  is  that  these  are  mostly  unknown  or  latent  and  cannot  be 
anticipated in the cost-benefit calculations of contemporary economic activity. Economic and 
ecological systems are at different ‘orders of complexity’ and the former has a creative and 
adaptive capacity that the latter lacks (Foster 2005).  
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  Fourth, our model must recognise that the political arena in such a co-evolving world 
is one of several possible spaces where endogenous action can occur in response to changes 
in  current  or  anticipated  environmental  circumstance.  Environmental  constraints  and 
ecological problems present emergent opportunities for political entrepreneurs. This is also a 
legitimate  mode of response (Lachmann 1986). There  may also  be  behavioural or socio-
cultural change (i.e. changed preferences induced by changed models of behaviour that are 
then  adopted)  as  well.  Furthermore,  these  political,  socio-cultural  and  economic 
entrepreneurial responses may interact in complex ways.   
  A  model  of  economic-environmental  co-evolutionary  dynamics  of  this  kind  must 
emphasise  the  core  role  of  experimental  new  ideas.  This  ‘new  knowledge’  dimension  is 
commonly neglected in models of economic-ecological dynamics. Entrepreneurship provides 
the  experimentation  that  both  causes  and  maintains  these  dynamics.  Economies  are  only 
sustainable,  in other words, through their capacity to facilitate, rather than constrain, the 
ability of entrepreneurship to generate new solutions to extant environmental problems.  
 
3  The dynamic structure of ecological and economic co-evolution 
Economic  activity  is  always  embedded  in  an  ecological  context.  Economic  activity  is 
‘squeezed’ at the  margin  as  increased environmental  scarcities will cause price rises that 
induce substitution toward economic activities with lowered environmental impact. But there 
is nothing automatic about such substitutions in complex situations since they always involve 
uncertainty and it is here that neoclassical economics can be highly misleading because too 
strong assumptions are made about knowledge and risk. The substitution of one technology 
for  another  is  a  difficult  matter  and  history  is  littered  with  failures.  We  can  think  of  a  
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degrading environment as opening up an entrepreneurial opportunity space as a map of the 
actual and perceived constraints. Within this space, four complex systems co-evolve:  
1.  the economic system  
2.  the ecological system  
3.  the political system 
4.  the socio-cultural system 
These are connected through multiple interactions and feedbacks. As such, any model of this 
co-evolution must have the following three mechanisms:  
1.  how economic systems evolve (e.g.. Dopfer and Potts 2008)  
2.  how ecological systems respond (i.e. the ecological part of ecological economics) 
3.  how  political/socio-cultural  systems  respond  to  ecological  change  caused  by 
economic evolution  
We sketch the structure of our co-evolutionary model in Figure 1. In the beginning, there 
is an economic innovation derived from a new ‘generic’ idea that changes the structure and 
level  of  resource  use  (we  call  this  a  ‘meso  trajectory’).  Eventually,  this  creates  a  set of 
environmental and ecological  impacts. When the environmental conditions that originally 
prevailed have been seriously damaged, or are perceived to be so in the foreseeable future, 
new entrepreneurial opportunities emerge (Shackle 1972). However, inasmuch as new actions 
emerge to resolve that problem, new problems are, in turn, created (Arthur 2009). So the co-
evolutionary  process  can  continue  as  one  of  emergent  cumulative  causation  with  many 
possible end states.  
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Figure 1.  Economic and environmental co-evolution 
 
In  constructing  a  co-evolutionary  model,  we  employ  the  ‘micro  meso  macro’ 
analytical  framework  (Dopfer  et  al  2004;  Dopfer  2005;  Dopfer  and  Potts  2008).  In  this 
framework, the economic system is viewed as having at its core an inter-connected system of 
rules. The application of these rules in a diverse range of microeconomic contexts results in 
the generation of  value which can  be aggregated at the  macroeconomic  level of  inquiry. 
Economic  evolution  occurs  when  new  rules  to  generate  value  are  applied  at  the 
microeconomic level by entrepreneurial action. These rules spread as they are taken up by a 
population  of  adopters.  At  the  same  time,  some  rules  fall  out  of  favour  and  decline  in 
importance. What the micro-meso-macro framework does is depict the economy as a network 
structure where ‘creative destruction’ is concerned with the coming and going of rules. 
We  can  start  with  an  initial  state  where  there  is  an  economic  order  (M)  that  is 
composed of a  coordinated  macro system  made up of generic (meso) rules. Each rule  is 
carried by a population of micro agents. So M = {M1, M2, …Mi, …Mn}, where the elements 
Mi are the populations that have adopted each rule. Thus M is the knowledge-base of the  
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economic  order.  This  ‘knowledge  economy’  is  capable  of  transforming  human  energy, 
physical energy and natural resources into flows and stocks of goods and services.   
  Economic evolution is defined as a change in the set M → M′ by the origination, 
adoption and retention of a new generic rule Mi+1. This so-called ‘meso trajectory’ (Dopfer et 
al 2004; Dopfer and Potts 2008: chapter 4) defines economic evolution as the process by 
which a new ‘generic rule’ in the form of an idea, technology, or business model results in 
the transformation of the generic  structure of the economic order to M′. As such, M′  is 
associated  with  higher  system  complexity,  higher  total  economic  value  and  more  ‘work’ 
achieved either through higher energetic throughput and/or the more efficient use of energy. 
M contains rules that relate to the exploitation of the natural environment. Generally, it has 
been accepted in human civilizations, at least since the hunter-gather era, that the natural 
environment is an exploitable resource to be degraded at will to meet agricultural, industrial 
and urbanisation needs. So we have ecological degradation (E → E′). This is the response 
since natural evolution is too slow to adapt to fast moving economic evolution.  
However, now that we have represented the economy as a system of meso rules which 
changes in response to the application of new knowledge, we know that the rules that relate 
to the economy-environment interface will also  change  if opportunities to generate value 
arise. Clearly, the best way to generate value into the future is not just to exploit to the point 
of  total  degradation.  This  is  a  point of  maximum  entropy  and  precisely  what  dissipative 
systems are always seeking to avoid. So the tendency towards serious degradation provides 
economic opportunities to devise and apply  new rules to generate value through reduced 
exploitation and environmental protection. Whether this succeeds depends critically upon the 
extent  to  which  vested  interests  allow  new  rules  to  be  applied.  Here  we  observe  wide 
variations throughout history but also an increased tolerance of entrepreneurial activity as we 
have moved towards more open, democratic societies.   
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Economic  value  is  generated  by  the  transactions  and  transformations  of  resources 
made  possible  by  the  existence  of  meso  rules.  Energy  flow  is  unavoidable  in  all  such 
economic operations. For much of human history the energy used was largely food fuelled 
human activity and the burning of biomass. This did result in environmental degradation but 
not on  the  grand  scale  that  we  have  witnessed  in  the  era  of  fossil  fuels.  In  the  modern 
economy, economic operations can involve direct energetic processes (e.g. transformations 
such  as  smelting  metals)  which  use  large  amounts  of  fossil  fuel  energy  with  clear 
environmental  effects.  However,  there  are  also  economic  operations  that  are  mainly 
concerned with the storing and manipulation of information. These tend to be electronic and 
use relatively low levels of energy but they can result in very significant increases in the 
efficiency  of  energy  use  in  delivering  both  existing  and  new  goods  and  services. 
Correspondingly, innovations in such operations increase significantly our access and use of 
information about the environmental impacts of human activity.  
This  emergent  capacity  to  use  electronic  energy  to  access  a  vast  amount  of 
information  and  computational  power  has  opened  up  new  kinds  of  entrepreneurial 
opportunities.  Viable  alternative  energy  generation  systems  have  been  made  possible, 
affordable technologies to monitor environmental conditions have emerged and electronic 
communication systems have provided platforms for millions of people to understand and 
discuss the environmental impacts of economic activities. Two kinds of meso rules have been 
emerging: first there are technological and organisational ones that entrepreneurs adopt to 
create value from the sale of environmental protecting systems; second, there are those that 
are socio-cultural  in  nature that are adopted by people  in  a way that  influences political 
processes and related institutions. In our co-evolutionary process, adopters of the latter meso 
rules  are,  in  effect,  representing  the  ‘interests’  of  both  the  natural  environment  and  the 
welfare of future generations.   
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Economic evolution (M → M′) thus moves the economic order up an energy gradient 
(E → E′). This is associated with a higher throughput of energy that as a vector of both 
quantitative and qualitative change  is consistent with the  first phase of an environmental 
Kuznets  curve.  Environmental  degradation  may  take  many  possible  forms,  including 
pollutants or environmental loading, loss of bio-diversity, loss of resilience, depletion of a 
resource  stock,  or  increases  in  population  driving  increased  use.  All  of  these  constitute 
signals, either directly or indirectly, to possible entrepreneurial agents that opportunities are 
coming into existence.  
There are at least five ways this may arise. The first is via direct observation, as for 
example with observation of atmospheric pollution or deforestation. A second way is theory-
based  observation.  This  relies  on  scientific  concepts  and  measuring  technologies,  as  for 
example, pesticides or the ozone hole. A third way goes via media and social networks (Potts 
et al. 2008), as for example, global warming. A fourth way is via market operations due to: 
(1)  supply  changes,  in  which  price  changes  signal  changes  in  scarcity  conditions;  or  (2) 
demand changes where preferences have endogenously changed (Earl and Potts 2004). A 
fifth mechanism is via expectations. These can be embodied in prices in markets with a future 
dimension,  which  is  only  possible  where  there  is  an  interaction  of  mental  models  at the 
‘fourth order’ of complexity (Foster 2005). Each of these mechanisms offers an opportunity 
for entrepreneurship to occur, whether  it  is the  political entrepreneurship  involved  in the 
introduction  of  new  laws,  the  social  entrepreneurship  of  promoting  new  fashions,  the 
economic  entrepreneurship  of  devising  business  models,  or  as  a  complex  entrepreneurial 
opportunity  involving  some  or  all  of  these.  There  is  a  considerable  literature  on 
entrepreneurial  opportunity  which  presumes  that  opportunities  are  exogenous.  Here  we 
regard  them  as  endogenous  in  a  similar  way  to  Acs  et  al  (2009),  but  from  a  different 




4  Entrepreneurial response 
Environmental  loss,  as  caused  by  prior  economic  evolution,  thus  offers  four  classes  of 
entrepreneurial opportunity: political; socio-cultural; technical; and economic, as in Table 1 
below.  
 
Class  Mode  Mechanism  Example  Incentive 
Socio-
cultural 








Political  New laws, or resource 
transfers 
Law, force  Carbon taxes  Reputation, votes 




Solar PV cells 
and systems 
Profit, provision of 
public goods 
Economic  New business models, 
commodities or services 
Market, consumer 
choice 
‘Greening’ of the 
economy 
Profit, market share 
Table 1: Four modes of entrepreneurial response to environmental problems/opportunities  
 
First, we may conceive of the lead response emerging in the form of social or cultural 
entrepreneurship  in  the  form  of  corporate  leadership,  celebrity  leadership,  or  fashion 
leadership, or in general the process by which a local initiative has wider effect. The socio-
cultural mechanism works via seeking to change beliefs, preferences and behaviours via an 
imitation or social learning mechanism. This creation and adoption of meso-rules may be 
spontaneous, in the form of the emergence of cultural leadership and fashion, or it may be 
more systematic and programmed via education and media mechanisms. This socio-cultural 
mechanism does not require a single general solution (i.e. a new law), but will issue from a  
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diversity of behaviours that are then subject to differential copying or replication over social 
networks (Bentley et al 2007). In this way, new models of thought and behaviour, as well as 
social organizations and institutions, may emerge in response to environmental problems. 
The entrepreneurial response here refers to the agents that provide the institutional or cultural 
seeds, in the form of new models of thought, action or organization that might subsequently 
be replicated by others. 
Second, environmental problems present political opportunities to the entrepreneurial 
politician  or  law-maker  if  a  socio-cultural  meso-rule  concerning  action  to  solve  an 
environmental  problem  has  been  widely  adopted.  Such  political  solutions  (i.e.  fiscal  or 
regulatory response) are retailed by most political franchises. Such political entrepreneurship 
creates  new  conditions  for  ongoing  economic  evolution  by  changing  the  underlying 
constraints and opportunity sets for value creation, thus providing entrepreneurial feedback 
(via constitutional rules) from the environmental problem to new economic rules of the game. 
In  the  Hayek/Schotter  model,  laws  (as  governing  institutions)  are  the  product  of  self-
organization, the codifying of emergent patterns of actions. Yet even from this perspective, 
we may view laws as the product of political entrepreneurship both in proposing new ‘rules 
of the game’ or in leading the drive to their codification. Environmental problems are thus 
entrepreneurially resolved politically in the form of new laws, treaties, agreements, etc.   
The third entrepreneurial mechanism concerns scientists, technologists and engineers. 
All are part of processes that yield physical, chemical (and now micro-biological) discoveries 
that can be used to devise new techniques and new combinations of components in machines 
and mechanisms that can do work using energy. Because there is a significant ‘public good’ 
dimension to technologies, there is governmental support for education, training and research. 
Entrepreneurs in this space seek to secure patents or simply be first to develop and profit 
from a new technology or machine. For example, the increased concern over global warming  
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has stimulated a great deal of entrepreneurship in the development and commercialisation of 
new, low carbon emitting power generation. Because of the public good dimension, support 
for this kind of entrepreneurship and the associated innovation process is both private and 
public. This is because the uncertainty involved renders these technologies too high risk to be 
financed adequately only by the private sector yet it is a high social priority to ensure that 
they are developed once the meso-rule that originated in the socio-cultural domain becomes 
embedded in the political process and related policies. Because of the ‘creative destruction’ 
that  the  development  of  such  technologies  can  bring,  often  political  entrepreneurs  are 
essential to overcome entrenched vested interests.    
The  fourth  entrepreneurial  mechanism  concerns  the  economic  agent  engaged  in 
seeking  to  create  value  by  the  discovery,  origination  and  realization  of  new  market 
opportunities  created  by  new  environmental  problems  (Dean  and  McMullin  2007).  Such 
entrepreneurial ventures will seek to provide new solutions, in the form of new goods or 
services, either as new choices or product niches within existing market categories or as new 
business models and technologies. For example, there is seemingly high and growing demand 
for ‘green consumption’ (which in part of course derives from the effects of socio-cultural 
and political entrepreneurial actions; e.g. Keogh and Polonsky 1998). Thus, there are profit 
incentives to develop new ‘green’ goods and services, a process presently working its way 
through much of the economy.  
It should be apparent that these four entrepreneurial mechanisms have to interact in 
order for there to be effective action. There are examples in history where this has occurred 
(Schaper 2005) but there are others where there was failure. The volume by Landes et al 
(2010) contains a  number of examples  where there was a disconnect between these  four 
mechanisms of entrepreneurial action by political  interest groups or defenders of cultural  
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norms led to the negation of entrepreneurial attempts to enact, and profit from, changes that 
could have averted crises and catastrophes.  
 
5  Implications 
This entrepreneur-centred co-evolutionary  model has  several  implications  for the  analytic 
focus of ecological economics.  
First, it implies that the value of a resource, and indeed the very notion of what even 
‘counts’ as a resource, along with how it is distributed and owned are less fixed from the 
entrepreneurial-evolutionary  economic  perspective.  This  is  due  to  the  entrepreneurial 
possibility of changing the ‘rules of the game’, or effecting change in the knowledge-base of 
the economy. As such, the co-evolutionary perspective is sceptical of standard notions of 
exogenously imposed resource constraints (i.e. a known non-renewable stock of x, or of a 
maximum flow of environmental services of y), or of concepts of sustainability that leave no 
role for new knowledge that is the result of entrepreneurial experiment and innovation.  
Secondly, expectations play a larger role in this model than in conventional models of 
economic-environmental dynamics because of the central role of entrepreneurial action in 
formulating responses by creating new rules, solutions, business models, etc, in the face of 
uncertainty  (Lachmann  1986).  Here  the  perspective  is  starkly  different  to  standard, 
neoclassical  economics  since  all  four  of  the  entrepreneurial  responses  discussed  occur  in 
states of uncertainty where meso-rule ‘understandings’ have to emerge to enable innovative 
experiments  to  occur  and  best  practices  to  spread  through  imitation,  collaboration  and 
selection  (Earl  and  Wakeley,  2010).  The  neoclassical  perspective  lays  most  stress  upon 
economic  responses  to  price  incentives  where,  for  example,  the  increasing  scarcity  of  
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resources  or  costs  imposed  as  negative  externalities  due  to  depletion  of  environmental 
services raise prices.  
Now,  there  is  little  doubt  that  prices  are  important  in  signalling  entrepreneurial 
opportunity  (Kirzner  1973),  but,  because  of  the  uncertainty  involved  in  innovative 
experimentation, considerable entrepreneurial failure always occurs. So there is much more 
involved  than  simply  the  neoclassical  response,  which  presumes  either  certainty  or 
quantifiable  risk.  Only  through  the  adoption  of  meso-rules  in  the  formation  of  beliefs, 
aspirations and common understandings, will entrepreneurs respond to price incentives. The 
entrepreneur does not just react to prices set by a market, s/he seeks to bring a new market 
into existence and to lead in such a market by forecasting how particular patterns of change 
play  out  with  conjectures  of  future  relative  prices  or  what  expected  patterns  of  relative 
demands  and  scarcities  might  be.  This  kind  of  future-oriented,  connection-establishing 
behaviour is an example of what Foster (2005) calls fourth-order complexity. Note also that, 
just as we can speak of different domains of expectations, we may also speak of different 
domains of uncertainty as corresponding to, for example, technological,  market, political, 
regulatory, cultural and even ecological circumstances. There  is scope  for entrepreneurial 
response over each dimension of uncertainty and their interconnections. 
A third observation is that entrepreneurial action is properly understood as making 
conjectures about the value a new idea might create, and then putting that into action in 
pursuit of profit. As we have noted, this is not necessarily a pecuniary profit, but may include 
identity, social  attention, power or favours,  many of which can  be converted to material 
forms through subsequent exchanges. Profit-seeking is not the only class of strategic action in 
the  face of  opportunities;  the  other of  course  is  rent-seeking.  Rent-seeking  in  economic-
environmental  co-evolutionary  contexts  is  likely  to  be  as  prevalent  as  in  any  domain  of 
economic life. Its main effect operates via the formation of coalitions, both within and across  
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economic, cultural and political domains that act to lock-in particular institutional rights or 
advantages  or  to  exclude  or  make  difficult  the  adoption  of  new  solutions  to  emergent 
problems. In other words, they operate by seeking to shut-down ‘positive’ entrepreneurial 
responses  (whether  political,  cultural  or  economic).  Thus,  the  meso-rules  embodied  in 
existing institutions that determine the nature and extent of connections between economic 
and environmental systems need to be evaluated not only in terms of static properties such as 
allocative efficiency, fairness and so on, but also in terms of their adaptive flexibility and 
openness to change.  
Fourth, because economic activity  is often  mobile and responsive to both relative 
prices and  institutional regimes this  model opens  new perspectives on globalization. The 
main  implication  that  follows  from  the  entrepreneur-driven  evolutionary  model  is  that 
environmental degradation must spread over the entire planet, a process we might think of as 
‘globalized ecological degradation’. This also implies that our four entrepreneurial feedbacks 
in the face of such degradation also have to be global in reach. In this regard it should be 
apparent that both economic systems and socio-cultural systems by far lead the way in the 
global  context,  and  thus  have  a  powerful  competitive  advantage  over  political 
entrepreneurship at the global level, which is the opposite of the situation at more local levels 
where political forces tend to have a greater impact. This points to the likelihood that global 
environmental treaties may be necessarily parasitic on, or symbiotic with, economic treaties, 
or global cultural movements (religious or secular). For example, these interconnections are 
very evident in the global debate concerning global warming and what to do about it. What 
we observe is not a logical discussion but a struggle between existing adopters of both socio-
cultural, e.g., religious, and economic (e.g., a belief in maximal economic growth) meso-rules 
versus adopters of an emergent meso-rule that we must act to mitigate climate change. This is  
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not a scientific discussion  but one  involving the struggle  between  existing and emerging 
meso rules, driven by entrepreneurial behaviours. 
Fifth, the co-evolutionary model points toward conceptualising policy responses in 
terms of entrepreneur-led adaptation rather than expert-led optimization. In a co-evolutionary 
context there is no ideal or optimal policy setting for the simple reason that the set of ‘old’ 
meso-rules,  embodied  in  existing  institutions,  will  be  subject  to ongoing  change  and  the 
nature  of  this  is  uncertain  in  a  radical  sense.  This  change  comes  from  continuous 
experimentation  and  learning,  consolidated  by  entrepreneurial  value  creation  as 
circumstances change. Just as there is no ultimately final most-winning competitive business 
strategy  but rather a race without end, so too is there no ultimate optimal environmental 
policy  but  rather  a  continual  process  of  ongoing  experimentation,  learning  and  policy 
adaptation (Potts 2009). The key role of government is not ‘picking winners’ intervention but 
the careful  nurturing and  formalization of  facilitating  meso-rules  and the provision of an 
incentive structure in markets that signals to entrepreneurs the direction that their ventures 
should take. Generally, entrepreneurs will do a better job  more quickly than government 
planners. For example, in countries such as Spain and Germany, the provision of feed-in 
tariffs has led to entrepreneurially driven innovations and reductions in unit costs in solar 
power generation that government could not have achieved through direct action. Market-
based emissions trading schemes, coupled with appropriately reinforcing political and socio-
cultural  meso-rules,  promotes  a  diversity  of  entrepreneurial  experiments  and  beneficial 
outcomes  that  would  not  be  otherwise  possible.  This  meso  rule  reinforcement  is  also 
important because such policies are expensive and taxpayers will only tolerate a rising cost 
burden if there is a well-established meso-rule that mitigation of climate change is a very 
high priority.  
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Sixth, it is entirely reasonable to question the efficacy of entrepreneurial responses in 
the  market  domain  in  relation  to  their  specialization  and  experience.  Entrepreneurs  in  a 
market economy may be well-honed to take advantage of opportunities presented in solving 
problems in the domains of consumer and producer goods and services, but they may be less 
well-versed in dealing with environmental opportunities. Raising awareness of environmental 
problems and proposals for their solution begin with socio-cultural entrepreneurship and, if 
an associated meso-rule set is adopted widely, political entrepreneurs will begin to devise 
appropriate policy proposals. An immediate effect is likely to be increased public support for 
appropriate  technological  entrepreneurship  but  lack  of  experience  is  likely  to  mean  that 
economic entrepreneurs will experience high failure rates. It is for this reason that venture 
capitalists are often reluctant to finance entrepreneurial, high risk projects and it is, therefore, 
essential that government is heavily involved in providing appropriate support and facilitation 
to  solve  what  is  principally  a  public  good  problem.  In  instances  where  environmental 
problems have a high degree of visibility (e.g. urban smog), emotional salience (e.g. genetic 
modification), or low discount rates (e.g. climate change) political entrepreneurship may well 
be highly effective in this regard. But when problems are less visible or charismatic, such as 
with  krill  stocks,  or  involving  environmental  problems  that  do  not  respect  political 
boundaries,  then  global  socio-cultural  entrepreneurship,  Greenpeace  style,  may  have  a 
comparative advantage. 
 
6  Conclusion 
We have sought to outline a co-evolutionary model of economic and environmental systems 
connected,  both  negatively  and  positively,  by  entrepreneurial  endeavour.  In  this  model 
‘economic-only’ entrepreneurship and innovation tend to have negative environmental and 
ecological effects that, in turn, create new entrepreneurial opportunities over several domains:  
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political, cultural, technological and economic. These different entrepreneurial pathways can 
lead to new meso-rule sets, embodied in new institutions. However, in an interconnected 
economy-environment system we can expect new environmental problems to arise that then 
present new entrepreneurial opportunities, so beginning the cycle again. Thus, we believe that 
it is necessary to adopt a co-evolutionary, non-equilibrium modelling approach in which the 
core processes are the application of both free energy and new knowledge (Foster, 2010)  
The schematic model that we have sketched here is preliminary. However, it provides 
a  sound  basis  for  further  analytical  and  empirical  development.  In  dealing  with  the 
behavioural  mechanisms  that  connect  two  open  complex  adaptive  systems  that  evolve 
through a mix of self-organization and competitive selection, a new methodology is required. 
Foster  and  Potts  (2009)  have  proposed  a  mix  of  historical,  statistical  and  agent-based 
simulation  and  calibration  that  would  seem  to  be  a  good  starting  point  in  studying  the 
interaction  between  economic  system  and  environmental  system  co-evolution.  We  have 
argued here that this is not only a resource interaction (á la Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen and 
Kenneth Boulding et al, and subsequently by John Gowdy and Jeroen van den Bergh et al), 
but it also involves complex entrepreneurial feedbacks, and it is this latter mechanism of co-
evolution that, in our view, properly defines the dynamic relation between evolutionary and 
ecological economics.  
Yet if we are correct about this mechanism, then this implies that the conceptions of 
sustainable economic growth and also of environmentally-friendly economic policy are both 
widely  misconstrued.  In  both  cases,  entrepreneurship  is  the  proximate  cause  of  many 
ecological problems but can also be their solution. However, such solutions can never be 
final, or in equilibrium, because solving one set of problems inevitably introduces a new set – 
this is a fundamental feature of a co-evolutionary interaction. We have also emphasised that 
entrepreneurial  responses  play  out  over  different  and  sometimes  competing  domains:  
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variously  economic,  political,  technological  and  socio-cultural.  That  these  can  be  either  
competing or synergetic domains is insufficiently appreciated in models of economic and 
ecological dynamics, which commonly presume just ‘market failure’ with uniquely political 
solutions  such  as  environmental  regulations,  taxes  or  transfers.  Yet  when  environmental 
crises  are  recognised  as  unintended  consequences  of  past  entrepreneurship,  we  may  then 
appreciate how further entrepreneurship may resolve these problems. So there may well be no 
such  thing  as  a  definitive  economic  solution  to  an  environmental  problem.  Rather, 
environmental problems are better conceptualised as due to the continuous presence in human 
systems of entrepreneurial action to solve emergent problems in innovative ways. For the 
entrepreneur, an environmental problem is just another problem that presents an opportunity 
for gain. However, entrepreneurship can only occur if there are a set of facilitating rules that 
allow the possibility of gain. In this sense, the environmental context is no different and 
environmental policy should be oriented much more towards entrepreneurial facilitation than 
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